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Abstract
To determine the effects of corporate governance on earnings management, this paper analyzed 171 annual
reports from issued 2006 to 2009 by 57 non-financial, joint stock companies implementing GCG (Good
Corporate Governance) practices, which were listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Six corporate
governance variables (board composition, independent commissioners, separate chairman/CEO roles, audit
committee, managerial share ownership, and audit quality) as well as three control variables (leverage, size,
and ROA) were used. The results showed that two corporate governance variables significantly influenced
earnings management practices (separate chairman/CEO roles and managerial share ownership); the other
variables had no effect because these companies used GCG practices only to follow regulations rather than to
monitor and control.
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A company’s principal is either the shareholders
or owners while the agent is either the manage-
ment or a chief executive officer (CEO). In this
structure, the agent engages in work activities in
order to satisfy the principal.
The Agency Theory of earnings management
practice states that individuals tend to maximize
personal satisfaction. According to this theory, the
separation of ownership and control between agent
and principal motivates managers (agents) to engage
in opportunism: earnings management practices that
increase personal benefits to the detriment of the
principal’s benefits (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
This theory highlights the information asym-
metry between management and shareholders:
management has early access to key information,
and has opportunities to manipulate records. In-
vestors focus more on profits than management
process. Furthermore, principals cannot continu-
ously monitor agent actions.
Because of the conflict of interest between
agent and principal, corporate managers may en-
gage in earnings management to adjust financial data
to increase company value in the eyes of inves-
tors. Earnings management is defined as the pro-
cess of adjusting financial information in accor-
Effects of Corporate Governance Variables on Earnings Management in Indonesia
Stephanus Remond Waworuntu, Marko Sebira Hermawan, & Sheila Nerissa Hokardi
| 373 |
dance with applicable legal frameworks while ful-
filling specific, self-serving objectives.
There are four reasons for managers to ma-
nipulate financial reports: job security, contractual
agreements involving external shareholders and
managers, personal compensation schemes, or to
accomplish target earnings and market expecta-
tions (Healy & Wahlen, 1999).
Data manipulation of financial information
can misrepresent a company’s value to external
parties. Therefore, management must limit such
practices through effective monitoring concepts.
These concepts are developed into corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms known as Good Corporate Gov-
ernance (GCG).
Rising in popularity in the last decade, the
GCG concept is regarded as a foundation for com-
pany growth and success amidst global business
competition. The popularity of GCG increased af-
ter the large-scale financial manipulations at Enron
and WorldCom. The 1998 Asian financial crisis was
reportedly triggered by these events, as well as by
failure to implement good corporate governance
(Daniri, 2005). A survey ranked Indonesia lowest
in a corporate governance index (Booz-Allen, 1998).
According to Moeljono (2005), a country’s
ability to recover from a financial crisis depends
on each corporation in the country. Consequently,
Indonesian companies should start and increase
GCG awareness to excel in global business.
This study was motivated by the notion that
opportunistic earnings management practices are
widespread among companies in Indonesia. This
research examines how corporate governance vari-
ables reduce earnings management practices, par-
ticularly in Indonesia’s listed, non-finance companies.
A relationship occurs when a contract en-
gages two parties: an agent to perform some ser-
vice for a principal’s interests, and a principal who
authorizes the agent to act and to make decisions.
Since both agent and principal try and maximize
personal goals and value differences, it is almost
impossible for the agent to always act in the
principal’s behalf. This results in earnings manage-
ment practices (Jensen & Meckling, 1986).
Earnings management practices in financial
reports and in structuring transactions happen
when managers alter these reports to mislead
stakeholders about the economic performance of
a company (Healy & Wahlen, 1999).
There are two types of earnings manage-
ment: (1) efficient earnings management where pri-
vate information is communicated to transfer full
knowledge, and (2) opportunistic earnings manage-
ment, where managers transfer modified informa-
tion to their benefit (Scott, 2000). Efficient earn-
ings management occurs when managers accu-
rately communicate private information about firm
profitability, while opportunistic earnings manage-
ment occurs when managers distort the quality of
information (Subramanyam, 1996).
To minimize conflicts of interests between
company and shareholders, management should
engage in Good Corporate Governance (GCG),
which motivates the board and management with
incentives to purse stated objectives, thus encour-
aging more efficient use of resources. In Indone-
sia, GCG is described as: “… a set of rules that
define the relationship between shareholders,
managers, creditors, the government, employees
and other internal and external shareholders with
respect to their rights and responsibilities that have
the main objective of creating added value for the
stakeholders.” (FCGI, 2006).
Corporate Governance Practices
Independent Board
The 2007 Indonesian Company Law requires
firms classified as under the Perseroan Terbatas (PT)
structure to have a two-board system consisting
of a Board of Commissioners (BOC) and a Board
of Directors (BOD). The BOC is important in a
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company’s GCG implementation as it primarily
monitors, supervises and advises management in
the way the company is run. Three important cri-
teria affect BOC effectiveness: independence, com-
petence and commitment. The Board of Commission-
ers must include independent commissioners to
ensure that decisions are fair to all parties.
Section III.1.4 of the Jakarta Stock Exchange
Regulations says that independent commissioners
should be independent of the company and its
shareholders, and should comprise at least a third
of the total number of commissioners (Firmansyah
& Wiguna, 2004).
It has been found that firms with CEOs who
are also the firm’s board chairman are more likely
to be subject to SEC (Securities and Exchange Com-
mission) investigation for alleged GAAP (gener-
ally accepted accounting principles) violations
(Dechow, et al., 1996). Also, independent boards
constrain earnings management (Chtourou, et al.,
2001).
Audit Committee
Bapepam Regulation IX.I.5 requires all Au-
dit Committee members to be independent and
external parties (Herwidayatmo, 2004) and to only
be responsible to the Board of Commissioners.
Their responsibilities include submitting opinions
on accounting problems, financial statements, le-
gal compliance, risk management, internal moni-
toring systems and independent audits. An audit
committee must include at least one Independent
Commissioner who will act as Chairman, and at
least two independent members.
Research found that negative discretionary
accruals are significantly lower among firms with
an audit committee compared to firms with no
audit committee; positive discretionary accruals of
firms with an audit committee are not significantly
lower than those of firms with no audit commit-
tees (Parulian, 2004).
Managerial Share Ownership
It has been found that there is no transpar-
ency when a company’s management is privileged
with private information that supports its personal
interests (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000), which can
occur when company management holds owner-
ship shares, known as managerial share ownership.
However, to its credit, managerial owner-
ship has been used as a mechanism to reduce agency
problems by aligning the interest of managers and
shareholders. Research shows that agency prob-
lems are reduced when managerial share owner-
ship is enlarged to the point that managers need
not manipulate earnings for personal benefit
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Audit Quality
Researchers have correlated audit quality
with earnings management. For instance, qualified
auditors proxied by the Big Four reduce incidences
of earnings management (Al-Abbas, 2009;
Bauwhede, et al., 2003). However, others found
no significant evidence of the moderating effect
of audit quality on earnings management (Sandra
& Kusuma, 2004), which may indicate that auditor
size is not be an effective proxy for audit quality.
METHOD
Six variables went into the development of
the hypothesis used in this study: board of commis-
sioners, dual roles, audit committees, managerial own-
ership, auditor reputation and competence.
Board of Commissioners
The Board of Commissioners (BOC) is re-
sponsible for ensuring the reliability of financial
statements. Theoretically, the BOC affects the qual-
ity of financial reports used as a measure of earn-
ings management (Chtourou, et al., 2001).
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Smaller boards of four to six members may
be more able to make quick strategic decisions
(Goodstein, et al., 1994), while larger boards are
more capable of monitoring the actions of top
management (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).
An inverse proportion to the size of the
board and incidence of manipulating financial re-
ports has been found: it appears that, the larger
the board, the less likely for earnings management
practice to occur (Xie, et al., 2003).
Studies have found similar relationships be-
tween earnings management and board indepen-
dence and support the notion that boards which
are more independent of management are more
effective in monitoring corporate financial account-
ing procedures.
For instance, it has been found that the pres-
ence of outside boards reduced the probability of
fraud in financial statements (Beasley, 1996). As
well, companies with independent boards are less
likely to report abnormal accruals (Klein, 2002; Xie,
et al., 2003).
Dual Roles
The Agency Theory argues for the separa-
tion of roles; a Chairman should be independent
of company affairs to effectively check a CEO’s
over-ambitious plans (Blackburn, 1994).
On the other hand, the Stewardship Theory
says that a dual role, where the CEO is also the
chairman, improves firm performance because
management compensation is tied to company
performance. As well, the CEOs can run the firm
with minimum board interference (Rechner &
Dalton, 1991).
However, some researchers have found that
companies led by such a dual-role head do not per-
form as well as their counterparts (Abdul Rahman
& Haniffa, 2005) and are more likely to be subjected
to accounting enforcement actions by the SEC for
infringement of GAAP (Dechow, et al., 1996).
Audit Committees
The absence of audit committees make earn-
ings management easier while a qualified audit
committee can limit the practice (Dechow, et al,
1996; McMullen, 1996) or at least reduce it (Wedari,
2004).
Managerial Ownership
Managerial ownership can reduce agency
problems by aligning the agent’s and principal’s
interests. The larger proportion of managerial
ownership, the less likelihood for the manager to
manipulate earnings while, the lower the propor-
tion of managerial ownership, the higher incen-
tives for managers to manipulate earnings (Jensen
& Meckling, 1976).
Auditor Reputation and Competence
Companies audited by Big Six auditors use
less discretionary accruals to adjust reported earn-
ings (Francis, et al., 1999; Kim, et al., 2003; Krishnan,
2003). Furthermore, big auditors exercise more
effective control over corporate manipulation of
earnings statements. Size, leverage and ROA are
control variables used in the model (Kang & Kim,
2011; Al-Abbas, 2009).
The research population comprises compa-
nies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX)
and on Kompas 100 as of 30 January 2011. The
population selection criteria follows: (1) non-finan-
cial, IDX-listed companies from 2006-2009; (2) com-
panies with published 2006-2009 financial reports;
(3) companies with published information on in-
dependent commissioners, audit committees,
managerial ownerships, and auditors. The final
sample comprises 57 companies.
Financial companies such as banks, insurance
companies, and financing companies were excluded
from this study due to the wide variation of capital
structures and intensity of government regulations.
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Secondary data were obtained from annual
reports downloaded from the IDX database and
from company websites, comprising board com-
position, lists of independent commissioners, in-
siders’ shareholdings, audit committee member-
ships, independent auditor reports, and financial
statements.
To test the research hypothesis, the follow-
ing multiple linear regression formula uses work-
ing capital accruals as dependent variable and cor-
porate governance variables as independent vari-
able:
WCDAC =  + 1BOC + 2IC + 3CEO + 4AC +
5MSO + 6AQ + 7Size + 8Leverage
+9ROA + 
Where:
WCDAC : working capital discretionary accruals
BOC : number of commissioners on the board
IC : ratio of independent commissioners on
the board compared to total board of
commissioners
CEO : dummy variable (1) if CEO is the chair-
man and (0) if not
AC : number of audit committee members
in the firm
MSO : percentage of managerial share own-
ership
AQ : dummy variable (1) if auditor is one
of the big four firms and (0) if not
Size : natural log of total assets of firm
Leverage : debt ratio of firm
ROA : return on assets of firm
 : error term
The dependent variable used in this research
is earnings management, where working capital
accruals are used to proxy the earnings manage-
ment. Consistent with Xie, et al. (2003), working
capital accruals are used in this research because
managers have a great deal of discretion in shap-
ing their firms’ reports of actual earnings (Teoh, et
al., 1998). In addition, a lay user of financial state-
ments find managing earnings through accruals
manipulation more subtle and difficult to detect.
The use of working capital accruals as proxy
for earnings management is calculated using the
modified Jones Model. This model has been found
to be most effective in detecting manipulation in
earnings reports (Dechow, et al., 1996; Guay, et
al., 1996).
In the modified Jones (1995) model, work-
ing capital accruals are decomposed into non-dis-
cretionary accruals (NDAC) and discretionary ac-
cruals (DAC). NDAC or normal accruals are esti-
mates by managers that represent changes in the
underlying economic performance of the company.
On the other hand, DAC are affected by manager
discretion and thus used as proxy to measure earn-
ings management. NDAC are estimated during the
observation year (the year in which earnings man-
agement is estimated) as:
NDACi,t = (1/TAi,t-1) + (REV i,t – RECi,t /
TAi,t-1) (1)
Where:
NDAC : non-discretionary accruals for company
i in year t
TAi,t-1 : total assets for company i at the end of
year t-1
REVi,t : revenues for company i in year t less rev-
enues in year t-1
RECi,t : net receivables for company i in year t
less net receivables in year t-1
,  : industry-specific parameters
The change in receivables is subtracted from
the change in revenues to reflect the fact that the
change in receivables is treated as discretionary.
All variables in the regression model are deflated
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by lagged total assets to reduce heteroscedasticity
problems (Teoh, et al., 1998).
WCAj,t / TAj,t-1 = 1(1/TAj,t-1) + 1(REVj,t / TAj,t-1)
+ t (2)
Where:
WCAj,t : working capital accruals in year t for
industry j; defined as change in non-
cash current assets minus the change
in current liabilities.
WCAj,t = ( CAt - CASHt) - ( CLt –  STDt), in
which STD defined as current matu-
rity of long-term debt.
£1, 1 : ordinary least square (OLS) estimates
of £ and  in equation (1) above
t : regression residuals
Essentially, working capital discretionary ac-
cruals are regressed on revenue change since the
underlying assumption under this model is that
revenue is a component of NDAC. The DAC then
defined as the remaining portion of the WCDAC:
WCDACi,t = WC(1/TAt) – NDACi,t (3)
Where:
WCDACi,t : working capital discretionary accru-
als for company i in year t
WC : working capital
NDAC : non-discretionary accruals for com-
pany i in year t
The variables and their measurements uti-
lized in this study are summarized in the following
table:
FINDINGS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 illustrates the range (minimum and
maximum values), the average value and the stan-
dard deviation value of all variables utilized in
this empirical analysis:
Variables Type Measurements 
Earnings Management 
(Discretionary Accruals) 
Dependent Variable Proxy by working capital discretionary accruals 
(WCDAC) using the Modified Jones Model (1995).  
Board of Commissioners size Independent Variable Board size: Number of commissioners listed by 
the company. 
Independent Commissioners 
(Ratio) 
Independent Variable Independent board: Number of independent 
commissioners listed by the company, divided by 
total size of the Board of Commissioners. 
Separation roles of 
Chairman/CEO 
Independent Variable Separation: Dummy variable (1) if CEO is the 
same person as the Chairman and (0) if not. 
Audit Committee Independent Variable Number of Audit Committee members in the firm 
Managerial Ownership Independent Variable The proportion of shares in a company owned by 
the management of that company. 
Audit Quality Independent Variable Dummy variable (1) if the auditor is one of the Big 
Four firms (high audit quality) and (0) for firms 
audited by non-Big Four auditors (low audit 
quality). 
 
Table 1. Summarized of Variables and Measurements
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 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
BOC 228 2 12 5.25 2.263 
IC 228 0.000 0.750 0.36577 0.1405417 
AC 228 0 6 2.20 1.647 
MSO 228 0.000 0.2723 0.00614 0.02878 
Size (Ln) 228 25.2 32.21 29.166 1.27934 
Leverage 228 0.5458 3.604 0.5411 0.2906 
ROA 228 -0.067 0.6215 0.0396 0.08116 
WCDAC 228 -0.7461 1.3763 0.087723 
(0.000)* 
0.2176918 
Valid N (listwise) 228     
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
WCDAC are the working capital discretion-
ary accruals as the proxy for earnings management;
BOC is the number of commissioners on the board;
IC is the proportion of independent commission-
ers on the board compared to total number on the
Board of Commissioners; and MSO is the percent-
age of managerial share ownership held by the
management.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Dummy Variable
CEO is a dummy variable, (1) if CEO is the
same person as the Chairman and (0) if not; AQ is
a dummy variable, (1) if auditor is one of the Big
Four firms and (0) if not.
Table 2 illustrates the sample’s descriptive
statistics in the years 2006-2009. The mean for pro-
portion of independent commissioners compared
to total commissioners on the board fulfills the
independence requirement (Indonesia Stock Ex-
change Regulation III.1.4.) where the number in-
dependent commissioners on the board is at least
30% of the total BOC. The mean for independent
commissioners is 36.577% with a standard devia-
tion of 0.14054. This means that the Indonesian
companies in this study had independent parties
in the Board of Commissioners.
The WCDAC mean value is positive at 8.77%.
Based on the sample T-test, the WCDAC p-value
is significant at 0.000. This implies that, on aver-
age, large Indonesian firms managed their re-
ported earnings.
Table 3 shows that almost all companies
(98.69%) separate the roles of CEO and Chairman;
more than half of the population sample did not
have a competent in-house audit committee (mean
= 2.2) and was audited by Big Four auditors
(60.96%) who are employed in most large Indone-
sian companies due to the complexity and sophis-
tication of their financial activities (Abdul Rahman
& Haneem, 2006). Big Four auditors also provide
credibility to financial statements and result in high
investor confidence; their presence is expected to
minimize earnings management practices in com-
panies.
Table 4 shows an adjusted R square value of
0.18, which indicates that 18% of the independent
variables affect the dependent variable, where the
proxy element is working capital accruals. This
indicates that many other factors (82%) should be
accounted to explain variations in measuring earn-
ings management in the model used in this study.
The F-statistics is lower than the significance level
(5%), which indicates a great deal of evidence in-
ferring the validity of this model.
Separation role of 
CEO/Chairman 
1.31% 98.69% 
Audit Quality 60.96% 39.04% 
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DISCUSSION
In this research, not all corporate governance
variables are significantly related to earnings man-
agement. Some variables, such as CEO-owner role
separation and managerial share ownership, signifi-
cantly influence earnings management. Other variables
(board size, independent commissioner, audit com-
mittee, and audit quality) are not significantly related
to earnings management. Moreover, the control vari-
ables size and leverage significantly influence earn-
ings management, while ROA is not significant. These
findings are consistent with those of Kang & Kim
(2011).
The authors assume that the insignificant rela-
tionship between BOC and earnings management
occur because size is not a crucial element in deter-
mining the effectiveness of monitoring management,
which is consistent with the previous findings (Klein,
2002; Chtourou, et al., 2001; Xie, et al., 2003; Al-Abbas,
2009). The effectiveness of control mechanisms de-
pend on the values, norms, and beliefs held in an or-
ganization (Jennings, 2004 b; Oliver, 2004).
Table 4 shows that independent commission-
ers on the board and the competence of audit com-
mittees do not significantly affect earnings manage-
ment. This is consistent with other studies which found
no significant relationship between independent
boards in JSE-listed firms (Indonesia Stock Exchange)
and earnings management (Chtourou, et al. 2001; Park
& Shin, 2003).
This may be caused by several factors. First,
public companies only appoint independent boards
and establish audit committees to comply with regu-
lations rather than to monitor processes. Second, it is
possible that independent boards and audit commit-
tees are ineffective in carrying out monitoring func-
tions. Here, ineffectiveness is defined as lack of exper-
tise, of required skills, of experience, and of knowl-
edge in the business environment. Due to limited
knowledge about a company, outside boards rely on
management for information (Abdul Rahman &
Haneem, 2006). The third reason is that the minimum
number required of independent board membership
may insufficient to affect earnings management prac-
tices (Siregar & Utama, 2008). As minority groups,
outside boards are powerless to bring change or might
to act as an effective monitoring systems.
With the separation of the roles of owner and
CEO, there is no all-powerful person with concen-
trated authority to make earnings management pos-
sible. Such an individual can dominate the Board,
emasculate independent directors and, ultimately, not
represent the interests of the shareholders. The sepa-
ration leads to greater responsibility, and avoids temp-
tations such as biased decisions in favor of a CEO’s
interests at the expense of the company and the share-
holders. Previous studies show that companies with
combined roles do not perform as well as their coun-
terparts (Abdul Rahman & Haniffa, 2005) and are more
likely to be subjected to accounting enforcement ac-
tions by the SEC for GAAP infringements (Dechow,
et al., 1996).
Another corporate governance variable
which is significantly related to earnings manage-
ment is managerial share ownership. The larger
the managerial share ownership, the less likely for
Table 4. Multiple Regressions
Dependent variable: WCDAC
Notes: *significant  0.05 level
BOC -0.007 -0.089 0.929 
IC -0.188  -1.819 0.070 
CEO 0.108 1.725 0.014* 
AC 0.123 1.913 0.057 
MSO -0.253 -4.064 0.000* 
AQ 0.056 0.823 0.411 
Size -0.206 -2.459 0.015* 
Leverage -0.283 -4.508 0.000* 
ROA -0.031 -0.475 0.635 
N 
F-statistics  
(p-value) 
R square 
Adjusted R 
square  
228 
6.520 (0.000) 
 
0.212 
0.18 
  
 
Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan | KEUANGAN
Vol. 16, No.3, September 2012: 372–381
| 380 |
earnings management to occur, and vice versa. This
is echoed by other reports (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997;
Warfield, et al., 1995). The lower the share own-
ership, the lower the incentives received by man-
agers. As for personal maximization, managers
with low share ownership have more possibilities
to engage in opportunistic earnings management
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
The variable audit quality is not significantly
related to earnings management; Big Four auditors
do not necessarily restrict earnings management
practices. This is consistent with other studies that
found no significant evidence of audit quality’s
moderating effect on earnings management (Sandra
& Kusuma, 2004; Siregar & Utama, 2008).
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
The prediction about the ability of good cor-
porate governance practices to reduce earnings
management practices is not entirely accurate. Sepa-
rating the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) as well as managerial share ownership
are significantly related with earnings management.
The other corporate governance variables (board
of commissioner size, independent commissioners on the
board, audit committee competence, and audit qual-
ity) are not significantly related to working capi-
tal discretionary accruals.
Earnings management performed by man-
agers can beneficial for shareholders, particularly
where accounting discretion is used for improv-
ing informativeness of reported earnings (Peasnell,
et al., 2000). Thus, further research should inves-
tigate if discretionary accruals are harmful or ben-
eficial to shareholders or investors.
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